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Abstract  
We use social network analysis to better understand historic data on the administration of local 
governments. Despite advances in e-government applications, the public sector lags behind in analytics 
because information is locked in legacy data formats. Can e-government researchers bridge the gap 
between legacy data and analytics? We argue that computational analytic methods, popular in big data 
applications, can explain patterns that have gone unquestioned in previous research on government. 
Specifically, we consider how explanations of state government authority can be explained using a 
network perspective. These data were originally designed to describe administrative differences US 
territories and states. We investigate methodological challenges in building a weighted social network to 
confirm existing measures for calculating the power of the state governor. This project reports on the 
initial step in a broader study to cover all 50 states across multiple years and agencies. We compare the 
states that experienced the greatest differences in gubernatorial appointment power between 1992 and 
2012 Texas and Massachusetts. In addition, we identified that Information Systems agencies moved 
closer to gubernatorial control across all 50 states. Social network analysis improves existing 
measurements because it indicates the relationship between the governor and other top officials and 
agencies. An analytics approach explained where the power shifted across states and across time. 
Computational analysis of existing government data matches findings from previous studies as well as 
adding additional explanatory power. 
Keywords 
e-government, social network analysis, gubernatorial power. 
Introduction 
Big data and computational analytics are changing inquiry in information systems. Instead of relying on 
questions of simple variance, big data analysis can provide additional explanation about observable 
differences. This project reports on the first step in a broader study using analytics to better understand 
governance. With the proliferation of public sector information, e-government information systems 
researchers have particular opportunities to demonstrate the potential of computational analysis over 
existing methods. While big data and computational analysis is a popular new technique in information 
systems (Agarwal and Dhar 2014; Chen et al. 2012; Goes 2014; Kane et al. 2014; Sundararajan et al. 
2013), its value is still debated within social sciences. Computational analysis is not uniformly accepted 
and many scholars question knowledge claims that emerge from analytics (Bisel et al. 2014; boyd and 
Crawford 2012; Lin et al. 2013; Ruppert et al. 2013; Weinberg et al. 2013).  
To address those concerns, this study compares its findings to existing measures published by political 
scientists (Schlesinger 1965). We use social networking methods to analyze the administration of state 
governments. Specifically, we consider how organizational power is shared across multiple actors. While 
power has multiple dimensions, for the purpose of this paper we are focusing on the notion of power as 
control (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Smith et al. 2014). When a person has the ability to hire, he is likely to 
hire those with similar belief structures, who in turn are more likely to enact the changes requested by 
that person who made the appointment. In this study, we consider the power of the chief administrative 
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office, the governor, in US states. The governor appoints the leaders of executive agencies, such as Energy, 
Information Systems, or Education.  
Networks provide novel tools to address concerns about organizations and power. Previous studies on 
power were conducted as in-depth case studies , yet computational methods could reveal patterns of 
power within organizations (Markus et al. 2013a; Markus et al. 2013b; Markus and Robey 1983; Robey 
and Boudreau 1999; Salancik 1977). The study of networks particularly lends itself to computational 
analysis. The relational aspects of large data sets enable observations across time and many groups 
(Sundararajan et al. 2013). This paper introduces specific methods for converting existing government 
data to social networks.   
One way in which researchers have analyzed power within state government has been through the lens of 
gubernatorial power, in an attempt to find a correlation between gubernatorial powers and the ability of 
the governor to enact change. Political scientists measure gubernatorial power using Schlesinger’s Index 
of the Formal Powers of the Governor (Schlesinger 1965). Called the Formal Power Index (FPI), this index 
quantifies governor power along four dimensions measures (1) gubernatorial budget power, (2) 
appointment power, (3) veto power, and (4) tenure potential. However, each of these dimensions looks at 
gubernatorial power in a vacuum, without consideration of other actors who may be involved in each 
dimension. For example, in the case of appointment power, the FPI gives the governor a score based on 
his direct appointments, but fails to score others involved in the appointment of key personnel. The result 
is a score that could mean quite different things based on whether or not someone else scores higher than 
the governor. Social networking analysis seems to be an ideal method for understanding how other actors 
were involved in gubernatorial power. This paper argues that power within U.S. state government can be 
explained using methods that extended the single stakeholder perspective (i.e. the governor) to a network 
perspective. Analytics might provide a holistic picture needed to understand power within state 
government. 
We base our analysis on data on gubernatorial power taken from The Book of the States which has been 
used in past political science studies (Beyle 1968; Ferguson 2012; Schlesinger 1965). These data were 
originally designed to describe administrative differences between US territories and states. Existing 
measures showed observable differences that could not be explained (Dometrius 1987). We compare the 
states that experienced the greatest differences in gubernatorial appointment power between 1992 and 
2012, Texas and Massachusetts.  We also examine which agencies were closest to the control of the 
governor. We specifically consider how the Information Systems agency, first identified in 1992, changed 
over time.  
Through the use of social network analysis, we expand the power discussion to include other actors 
involved in state activities and demonstrate power dynamics within state government. The power 
structure within state government consists of both formal powers such as the ability to approve budgets, 
appoint positions, etc., and informal powers, such as political capital and party support. This paper 
demonstrates how social network analysis, using one measure of Schleslinger’s FPI, namely the power to 
appoint department heads in the state agencies, can expand the discussion beyond a single numeric 
measure into a broader discussion of how power has shifted over time. Through specific state examples 
we show that measurements available through social network analysis (SNA) allow us to not only produce 
similar results as the FPI technique produces, but also produce measures of other actors in the 
appointment process, as well as network level measures that demonstrate the overall characteristics of the 
entire network.  We show that changes occurring within states cannot be adequately explained using the 
legacy technique, yet we are able to glean additional insight through SNA that better helps to understand 
the changes occurring within the states. 
In order to understand the changes occurring within state government we look at the states of 
Massachusetts and Texas, and compare those states and their changes from 1992 to 2012. These states 
were chosen due to the fact that the formal power index would have ranked the governor of Texas as 
having the least appointment power, suggesting a decentralized structure, and the governor of 
Massachusetts with the most appointment powerful, suggesting a centralized structure, in 1992. However, 
over the 20 year period in which the appointive power of the governor of Texas remained the lowest of all 
50 states, the appointive power for the governor of Massachusetts declined the most of any of the 50 
states over that same period. The FPI leaves us scratching our heads as to what is occurring within 
Massachusetts while, through SNA, we are able to show that the governor appears to have delegated the 
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responsibility to his cabinet secretary and, when viewed in this way, shows a continued trend toward 
centralized power under the governor and not a decline in power. Texas, while exhibiting a decentralized 
structure across both time periods, has still moved toward centralizing under the governor. The visuals 
provided by the social network tools give further proof that the power structure within Massachusetts is 
not changing as much as could have been interpreted using the FPI. 
Our findings give us the necessary evidence to support moving more of the FPI over to social networks 
and we look to continued expansion of this work to help tackle the big data challenge of understanding 
power within state government. 
Literature review  
Index of the Formal Powers of the Governor 
Establishing quantitative measures for gubernatorial power has been of interest since Schlesinger 
(Schlesinger 1965) published his index of the Formal Power of the Governors in 1965. Over the years 
many have worked with this index, none more than Thad Beyle who as early as 1968, using both the 
original Book of the States data along with survey data, replicated the findings of Schlesinger (Beyle 
1968). The current version of the composite index includes the personal powers (such as Ambition 
Ladder) and institutional powers (such as Appointment Power) (Ferguson 2012). These individual 
measures are often summed or averaged into a general composite index (the FPI), or are used individually 
based on the topic being studied. 
This model has allowed researchers to make comparisons over more than a 60-year time period (1960 to 
2012). The index has been used to explain the effectiveness with which policy change can be enacted at the 
state level (Barrilleaux 1999; Erikson et al. 1989), conflict between the governor and legislature (Clarke 
1998), policy success (Ferguson 2003), and confidence in state government (Kelleher and Wolak 2007) to 
name just a few. 
However the model hasn’t been without its critics. Dometrius (Dometrius 1987) was particularly critical of 
the appointment power measure, arguing that as states have evolved and become more complex, the 
power has shifted away from some of the early agencies, but the index couldn’t address these changes. He 
goes so far as to say that it is “problematic to include the index, or any of its components, in the analyses 
of the contemporary governorship.”  
While others (Krupnikov and Shipan 2012) have proposed different ways to calculate these measures, we 
aren’t aware of any who have expanded the calculations beyond the sole actor of the governor. As Smith et 
al. state, “power is inherently a structural phenomenon where one actor’s influence over another needs to 
be considered within a wider network of relationships” (Smith et al. 2014). To this end we suggest that the 
scope of the legacy index needs to be expanded to include the “wider network of relationships” which can 
be accomplished using social network analysis. 
Social Network Analysis 
A social network perspective provides a new means of evaluating research questions through an analysis 
of the network structure (Wasserman 1994). Modern social network analysis consists of these four 
features (Freeman 2004): 
1. A foundation of systematic empirical data. 
2. Structural knowledge generated from social actors and the connections between those social 
actors. 
3. Reliance on knowledge emerging through graphical imagery. 
4. Established in mathematical and/or computational models. 
Social networks allow us to emphasize the relationships among actors that comprise the social system 
(Borgatti et al. 2013). These actors are called nodes and have attributes (for example, name, gender, age, 
tenure, etc.) that can distinguish each node from another. The relationships between the actors or nodes is 
called a link or edge. Edges can either be weighted or non-weighted. An example of a weighted network 
might be the frequency of interaction between the two nodes, or, as we will use, the relative power of the 
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link. Edges can also be directed or non-directed. A non-directed edge means that the link is equally 
valuable to each node, while a directed edge would indicate that the edge has a sender or originator, and a 
receiver.  
A key concept in social networks is the notion of centrality. Centrality, in general, means the relative 
importance of one node over the other nodes in the network (Borgatti 2005; Borgatti et al. 2009; 
Wasserman 1994). One measure of centrality is degree centrality which is a measure of the number of 
nodes directly connected to the focal node. In the context of this paper we will use degree centrality as a 
means of mapping back to the original FPI measurements 
Methodology 
We adopt a weighted network to emphasize that the power to appoint a position means more than the 
ability to approve that position. In fact, this weighting was inherent in the FPI, and lends itself quite well 
to being represented through a weighted network. We adopt directed links to emphasize that the power is 
uni-directional. When one party has the ability to appoint the other then they hold the power in that 
activity. 
We utilize the data source, The Book of the States (The Council of State Governments 1935-2012), as has 
been used by Schlesinger, Beyle, and Ferguson (Beyle 1968; Ferguson 2012; Schlesinger 1965). Published 
since 1935, the Book of the States identifies approximately 50 state agencies (the actual number varies on 
a year-to-year basis based on additions or subtractions to the table of State agencies, and will vary within 
states depending on whether they have such agencies), and identifies who is responsible for appointing 
and approving the head of each agency. This paper looks at the data over a 20 year period from 1992-
2012. 1992 was the first year that Information Systems agencies were identified in the Book of the States. 
2012 was the most recent. 
Legacy Weighting of FPI 
A sample of the Book of the States dataset is provided in Table 1. In this table you can see that for each 
agency, by state, there is a code identified. This code represents the combination of who appoints and who 
approves the head of that agency for that state.  
 
Table 1 Sample Book of the States Appointment Power 
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Following the process employed by Schlesinger, using the legacy appointment power encoding (see Table 
2), we were able to calculate the legacy FPI governor appointment power for each state from 1992 and 
2012.  
 Legacy Weighting converted to Social Network 
Next we attempted to convert the legacy encoding into values that we could use in social network analysis. 
We adopted a weighted network in order to capture the weighting that was achieved through the legacy 
encoding. In the scenarios (see Figure 1) used to present this work, all nodes are the same size while the 
arrows depicting the edges are sized according to their weight (so a wider arrow indicates more authority). 
We started with the first scenario, in which the governor has sole appointment and approval power. In the 
legacy encoding this would have a weight of 5, so in our network we are able to envision it appearing as 
seen in Figure 1, where the node representing the governor is connected to the node of the Head of the 
Agency with an edge that has a weight of 5. 
To round out the remaining scenarios: scenario 2 covers the weighting when the governor has 
appointment power and another party has the ability to approve that appointment. Scenario 3 is the 
weighting when the appointment and approval power is shared. Scenario 4 covers the weighting when 
someone else appoints the position and the governor approves that appointment. The 5th and final 
scenario covers the situation when the governor plays no formal role in appointing or approving the 
position. 
When we envision extending this encoding strategy to include all actors as nodes in the appointment and 
approval process a few issues immediately emerge. First, in scenario 1, in which a single person has both 
appointment and approval authority, he has a weight of 5, while in scenarios 2, 3, and 4 the combined 
weighting for the appointment and approval is 6. This suggests that scenario #1 may be underweighted (or 
2, 3, and 4 are over-weighted). Second, in scenario 5 we are giving a weight of 1, even in the case where the 
governor plays no role in the process. If we adopt this across all nodes then each will be attached to each 
other with at least a weight of 1, which doesn’t seem to make sense. Third, there are scenarios around 
shared responsibilities that aren’t covered in this model. For example, if the governor shares the 
responsibility for approval, we have no direction as to how to weight that using the legacy encoding. 
Table 2 Legacy Appointment Power Encoding 
Code Description 
5 Governor has sole discretion to appoint position 
4 Governor appoints position but it is approved by others 
3 Governor shares appointment power 
2 Other party appoints position and governor approves the appointment 
1 Governor plays no formal role in the appointment 
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Figure 1 Scenarios with Legacy Weighting 
Revised Weighting 
Due to these challenges, we propose a revised weighting scheme (see Figure 2) that attempts to conform 
as closely as possible to the legacy weightings, while at the same time making sense from a social network 
perspective. We employ a strategy in which an appointment is afforded a weight of 3 and an approval is 
afforded a weight of 1. We also give no weight to nodes that are not directly involved in the process. We 
then apply these to all of our scenarios. In the case of shared responsibility we simply divided the weight 
by the number of those involved.  
 Dynamics of Power in Government through Social Networks 
 
                                           Twenty-first Americas Conference on Information Systems, Puerto Rico, 2015 7 
 
 
Figure 2 Scenarios with Proposed Weighting 
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Network Creation 
Using this weighting scheme we can now create the network. To create 
the network we need the nodes and the edges. In the context of the 
state appointment network, the nodes will be any person (identified by 
their title) who is either appointed or participates in the appointment 
process though recommending or approving the appointment. The 
edges represent the appointing or approving action. For example, if the 
Governor is responsible for filling the position overseeing the Energy 
Agency, but the appointment requires approval from the Secretary of 
State, then we would have 3 nodes (Governor, Head of Energy, and Sec 
of State) and 2 edges (one linking Governor with the Head of Energy, 
and the other linking the Secretary of State with the Head of Energy). 
The nodes were identified in a two-step process. First we created a 
node for each head of agency identified in The Book of the States. This 
gave us an initial 51 nodes. We then used the coding scheme from the 
Book of the States to identify any additional nodes that were not listed 
as agency heads, but who had appointment or approval authority. This 
gave us an additional 7 nodes.  
Finally we have an indicator that some agency heads are neither 
appointed or approved, but rather are elected positions. We view the 
election process as an appointment and approval by the general public, 
so we created a final node called “Voting Public” to account for this 
scenario. This gives us a final tally of 60 nodes. A partial list of nodes can be seen in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To create the edges we took all of the codes in the Book of the States and converted these codes to edge 
weightings. For the weighting value we used the “revised weightings” we identified earlier. A partial list of 
edges can be seen in Table 4 where each row corresponds to 1 edge. The first two columns refer to the 
nodes and the third column refers to the edge weight. For example, the first row indicates that node #2, 
which is the governor, has an edge to node #11, which is the head of the Banking agency, with a weight of 
4, meaning the governor both appoints and approves that position.  
Results 
In selecting the states to analyze we looked at the relative ranking using the appointment power of the FPI 
for 1992 (see Table 5 for top and bottom ranked states). You can see that the state with the highest 
gubernatorial appointive power (with a legacy score of 3.96 on a 5-point scale) was Massachusetts, while 
Texas was the state with the lowest gubernatorial power (with a legacy score of 1.16 on a 5-point scale). 
Our belief was that the state with the highest score would represent the most centralized state, while the 
state with the lowest score was the best candidate for a decentralized state. We chose the ranking from 
1992 because we were interested in seeing how these states changed over the next 20 years.  
 
Node Name 
1 Voting Public 
2 Governor 
3 Lieutenant Governor 
4 Secretary of State 
5 Attorney General 
6 Treasurer 
7 Adjutant General 
8 Administration 
9 Agriculture 
10 Auditor 
11 Banking 
Table 3 Partial List of Nodes 
From 
Node 
To 
Node 
Edge 
Weight 
2 11 4 
2 12 4 
2 13 4 
14 14 4 
2 15 4 
Table 4 Partial List of Edges 
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State 
Gubernatorial 
Appointment 
Power using 
FPI 1992 
1992 
Rank 
Gubernatorial 
Appointment 
Power using 
FPI 2012 
2012 
Rank Change 
Massachusetts  3.96 1 3.07 7 -0.89 
Pennsylvania 3.91 2 3.43 2 -0.48 
Virginia 3.37 3 2.93 9 -0.43 
California 3.15 4 3.34 4 0.19 
Indiana 3.09 5 3.40 3 0.31 
Missouri 1.87 45 2.09 46 0.22 
Michigan 1.75 47 2.50 25 0.75 
Mississippi 1.55 48 2.21 42 0.67 
South Carolina 1.18 49 1.89 49 0.71 
Texas 1.16 50 1.71 50 0.56 
 
 
Massachusetts 
From Table 5 we see that the appointment power of the governor of Massachusetts was the highest of any 
governor in 1992, yet also dropped the most from 1992-2012. What the FPI is not able to tell us is where 
that power went, only that it appeared to be taken away from the governor. We begin with the 
appointment network of Massachusetts in 1992 as seen in Figure 3. What is shown appears to tell a story 
of centralized power, with the governor responsible for appointing most of the agency heads. Only 5 of the 
46 agencies, or 10.9% of all agencies, appointed their own head of the agency. While there are some minor 
actors in the appointive process, none come close to challenging the power the governor wields.  
 1992 2012 
Position Legacy 
Appointment 
Power 
Degree 
Centrality 
Degree 
Centrality 
/ # 
Agencies 
Legacy 
Appointment 
Power 
Degree 
Centrality 
Degree 
Centrality 
/ # 
Agencies 
Governor 3.96 136 2.96 3.07 99 2.15 
Cabinet 
Secretary 
n/a 0 0 n/a 58 1.26 
Voting 
Public 
n/a 24 .52 n/a 36 .78 
Boards n/a 0 0 n/a 12 .26 
Secretary 
of State 
n/a 8 .17 n/a 0 0 
Administr
ation 
n/a 8 .17 n/a 0 0 
Table 6 SNA Centrality Measures for Massachusetts 
Table 5 States with Highest and Lowest Appointment Power 
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Figure 3 Appointment Network; Massachusetts, 1992 
 
Figure 4 Appointment Network; Massachusetts, 2012 
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However, based on the decrease in FPI score, we suspect that significant changes occurred in 
Massachusetts between 1992 and 2012, with power being taken away from the governor. Figure 4 shows 
the appointment network for Massachusetts for 2012. Contrary to the notion that power is being stripped 
from the governor, it appears that the governor has delegated the appointment authority to his cabinet 
secretary, while still retaining the approval authority for almost all appointments. There is no indication 
of any type of power shift outside of the governor’s office, nor is power decentralizing. In fact, none of the 
5 agencies that appointed their own agency head in 1992 were still doing so in 2012. All 5 agencies are 
now appointed by the cabinet secretary and approved by the governor.  
Table 6 is the quantitative centrality measures for key nodes in the Massachusetts appointment network 
for 1992 and 2012. We can see that, when the governor and cabinet secretary roles are combined, the 
appointment power actually increased from 1992 to 2012. This contradicts the finding of the legacy FPI. 
Texas 
Using the FPI figures, the appointment power of the governor of Texas ranked lowest of any state in both 
1992 and 2012, but the increase in governor power over that time suggested a move toward centralization. 
First we look at the appointment network for 1992, which is presented in Figure 5. We can see that there 
are 9 agencies, representing 20% of all agencies, which appoint their own head. The governor indeed 
doesn’t appear to have much power, playing a role in appointing only 3 agency heads, and in each of those 
cases the appointment needs to be approved by the senate. By 2012 (see Figure 7) the governor appoints 8 
positions with none needing approval. Agencies appointing their own agency head decreased from 9 to 6. 
So, even though Texas ranked lowest in gubernatorial power over both time periods, we are seeing a move 
toward centralizing that power.  
 
Figure 5 Appointment Network; Texas, 1992 
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Figure 6 Appointment Network; Texas, 2012 
 
Agencies 
In selecting which agencies to analyze we followed the same 
process as we did with the states. We looked at the combined 
50-state gubernatorial power for each agency for the years 
1992 and 2012, and selected the agencies that appear to have 
the strongest move toward and away from the governor. As 
you can see in Table 7, Information Systems had the 
strongest move toward the governor while Energy had the 
strongest move away from the governor. 
Figures 7 and 8 show the network for appointing the head of 
the Information Systems agency for all 50 states in 1992 and 
2012 respectively. The nodes are sized according to their 
appointment power and represent who is responsible for 
appointing the agency head across all 50 states. You can see 
that the Information Systems node in 1992 is quite large in 
comparison to the other nodes. This is because the agency 
self-appoints its own head in 26 states in 1992 while the 
Governor only appoints the agency head in 6 states, 
representing a decentralized structure. However, by 2012 the 
Information Systems agency only appoints its own head in 15 
states, while the Governor appoints the head in 25 states. 
Figures 9 and 10 show how Energy agencies had the 
strongest move away from the governor from 1992 to 2012. 
Although you can see a slight decrease in the size of the 
governor node, if we consider delegated responsibility to the 
lieutenant governor and to the cabinet secretary then the 
overall strength of the governor has actually increased over 
this time period. Keep in mind that this is the agency that 
appeared to have the strongest move away from the governor 
using the FPI.  
Agency 
Governor FPI 
change  
Energy -0.48 
Higher education -0.29 
Public library 
development   
-0.27 
Purchasing -0.25 
Election 
administration 
-0.24 
… 
Administration 0.66 
Economic 
development 
0.70 
Social services 0.71 
Commerce 0.89 
Information 
systems 
1.23 
Table 7 Change in Gubernatorial 
Power by Agency 1992-2012 
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Discussion and Limitations 
Using the legacy FPI we saw a general trend toward more gubernatorial power, but there was evidence 
that some states who had a strong governor in 1992 were taking power away from the governor, while 
states with a weak governor in 1992 were giving more power to their governor. Our analysis of the state of 
Massachusetts contradicts this assumption, and shows that strong governor states may instead be 
adopting a delegated power structure. Similarly, the FPI numbers based on individual agencies, show a 
general trend toward granting the governor more power in appointing the heads of those agencies, but 
had some agencies moving away from the governor. When considering delegated authority as part of the 
governor authority that the agencies with the strongest move toward the governor would have been even 
stronger, and the agency with the strongest move away from the governor would have actually been 
considered as moving toward the governor. Valuable information can be obtained from filling out the 
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complete appointment network within state government. We have shown through direct examples that 
the single node method of calculating gubernatorial power can be misleading, and we have presented a 
new approach for the consideration of appointment power through networks. Based on the findings from 
Massachusetts and the Energy agency, we recommend that researchers using the FPI should consider 
changes to the weighting in cases where the governor has delegated the authority.  
We expect that expanding on this work will provide additional insights, similar to this scenario, which 
could be used to recommend changes to the FPI, highlighting one of the benefits of utilizing SNA in this 
manner.  In addition, we have shown that there is a benefit to seeing the entire appointment network 
across all 50 states, especially when considering the agency level trends across all states. 
This method can also be used to evaluate changes in state agencies. The trend toward giving the governor 
the power to appoint the agency head certainly suggests that Information Systems has moved into a more 
prominent role over this time period. The purpose of this paper is not to make conclusions about the 
implications of such a change, rather, to highlight the benefits of using network analysis in analyzing the 
structure of state government. 
Harking back to Freeman’s four features of social network analysis we have: 
a) Used data from the Book of the States to populate our network. We have employed a uniform 
weighting strategy to arrive at an unbiased measurement of centrality, which is applied to all 
nodes in the network in the same manner. 
b) If one accepts that there is power in the appointment of key personnel, this power is shifting 
within states in different ways, beyond what can be accounted for by looking only at the 
power of the governor in isolation. 
c) The graphics highlight these changes and emphasize these structural changes in ways that are 
harder to understand through tables alone.  
d) The measures are also visually represented.  
Limitations 
This work is based on results from a few key states and agencies. A continuation of this research, 
including a comprehensive view across all 50 states, will help clarify whether the trend toward 
centralization is confirmed.  
Conclusion 
Our contribution is a method by which the Index of the Formal Powers of the Governors can be recast in 
light of social network analysis. We have proposed a weighting scheme that can be employed and 
extended to all relevant parties in state government who participate in some way in the appointment 
process of key state government personnel. A measure of centrality (weighted out-degree / # of Agencies) 
can be utilized in the same manner that the original index has been used, preserving the ability to use the 
figures longitudinally, as well as perform direct governor comparisons between states as has been 
performed in other studies. Some states, such as Massachusetts, have moved beyond direct gubernatorial 
appointment, which makes not only the original index less effective, but also challenges researchers to 
find a centrality measure that looks beyond the immediate reach of the governor to avoid an under 
appreciation for the move toward centralization across states and agencies. 
Scoring a network, instead of an individual, can lead to such questions such as a) if an individual is losing 
power, where is that power going, b) how powerful is one individual in relation to all the others, and c) 
how is the dynamic process of power evolving over time? 
This project has shown how social network analysis could be used with legacy data. We offer a 
methodology for researchers and managers in the government domain who want to begin using analytics 
tools to understand existing data sets. The results of the social networking analysis explained where the 
power shifted across states and across time. Computational analysis of existing government data matches 
findings from previous studies as well as adding additional explanatory power. 
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